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I) INTRODUCTION 
The charitable sector in New Zealand has been under increasing scrutiny 
from the government, the public and even from itself. There are a range of issues for 
the sector; does the definition of charities have relevance in New Zealand in 2002? Is 
the preferential tax treatment of charities causing problems or is it being abused? Is 
the sector running effectively and efficiently? This paper will focus on the 
accountability of the sector. There has been increasing investigation into possible 
ways of increasing accountability in the area but ultimately nothing has been done. 
This paper will review the New Zealand situation and the proposals that have been 
set forward. It will then argue that a charities commission should be implemented in 
New Zealand. 
A). Why does the Public and the State Support Charities? 
Charities in New Zealand get support from both the private and the public 
sector. The primary justification for this is that charities are acting to benefit the 
public 1• One of the founding principles of charity law is that anything charitable must 
be in the public ' s benefit. This is a long-standing requirement; in 1767 Lord Camden 
LC defined charity as a ' gift to the general public use'
2
• This public benefit 
requirement continues today. In the most quoted statement of the definition of 
charity Lord MacNaghten stated in Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income 
Tax v Pemse/3: 
"Charity in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions, trusts for the relief of poverty; 
trusts for the advancement of education ; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for other 
purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the preceding heads ."
4 
1 Inland Revenue Department Tax and Charities: Discussion Document. (Wellington, 200 I), 6. 
2 Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co. Ltd {/951} AC 297 at 305 per l ord Sim onds. 
3 Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Ta,, v Pemsel (1891] AC at 583 per Lord MacNaghten 
4 (1891]AC531 at583 . 
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The courts approach to this definition has been to assume public benefit wh
en 
a purpose falls broadly into one of the first three of the familiar cate
gories of 
charity5. When the purpose claimed is the relief of poverty public benefi
t does not 
need to be shown.
6 This appears to be somewhat of an anomaly with no clear policy 
grounds. One possible justification is that relief of poverty is so inheren
tly in the 
public interest as to not require a demonstration of such. The rationale for 
the public 
benefit test seems to be based on preventing tax privileges or other bene
fits being 
received for private purposes. For example paying school fees may be 
charitable 
under the education head of charity but paying school fees for a son w
ould be a 
private purpose and not charitable.
7 
The definition of what is a charity has been criticised. The four heads fro
m 
Pemsels8 have been described as a matter of convenience for the courts rat
her than a 
definition. It excludes non-charitable purposes rather than describing what i
s or is not 
charitable. 9
 This has lead to an acknowledgment that this definition is not exclusive 
and that there may be other charitable purposes outside this definition
10
• The current 
definition does not always sit comfortably with what is commonly c
onsidered 
charitable in New Zealand. Maori providers often fall outside the definitio
n as they 
provide along iwi lines 
11
. This means that there is only "private benefit" as the 
benefit is for family members not the public at large. The government d
iscussion 
document Tax and Charities takes a colloquial view of what is charita
ble. 12 Its 
approach is to suggest that charities provide goods that are somehow "col
lective in 
their benefit". Implicitly this view of what is commonly charitable is still
 based on 
public benefit grounds, "collective goods" must benefit the public generally
, not just 
individuals. The document suggests that the current definition is too wide
 and calls 
5 National Anti-Vivisection Society v. inland Revenue Commissioners [ 1948) a
t 65 per Lord Simonds. 
6 Re Compton [/9./5] Ch 123 at I 37-139 per lord Greene. 
7 David Brown Charities and Public Benefit NZLJ (March 200 I) 69, 69. 
8 Commissioners for Special Purposes of income Tax v Pemsel [ 1891] AC at 5
66 per Lord Bremwell. 
9 Re Wallace [1908) VLR 636 at 638 per Hood J. 
10 D V B,yant Trust Board v Hamilton City Trust Board [ 1997) 3 NZLR 342 at
 348 per Hammond, 
following Scottish Burial Reform and Cremation Society Ltd v Glasgow Cor
poration [1968) AC 138. 
11 Tax Policy Advice Division Taxation of Maori Authorities: Discussion Docu
ment. (August 200 I.) 
http: //www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz1publications/ index.php?catid=2 (Last A
ccessed 14 August 2002) 
12 Inland Revenue Department Tax and Charities: Discussion Document. (Wel
lington 200 I ),4. 
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for a change to the definition in accordance with New Zealand in the 21 st century. 
The 2nd report of the Working Party Charities suggested adopting a legislative 
definition. This was seen more as a clarification and restatement of the current law 
then any wholesale change, importantly the public benefit test would remain but 
would be expanded to include Maori organisations.
13 While the government has 
considered this it does not anticipate any change in this area soon; the current 
approach seems to be to consider what other countries do first.
14 A change to the 
definition of charities does not have universal support. Submissions to the discussion 
document Tax and Charities have pointed out that the current definition has 
developed considerably from 1601 and even from the Pemsels case 110 years ago.
15 
The current definition is not archaic and out of date as has been suggested but has 
moved over time through the flexibility of the common law. Perhaps the best 
illustration of this is that the proposed change in definition would in fact have little 
effect on current charities status. Whether or not the definition is left with the 
common law or not public benefit can be seen to underlie the definition of charity, 
this element of public benefit is the primary justification for the government 
supporting charities. 
The public benefit role of charities has become more pronounced with the 
market reforms of the last decade and the governments continuing withdrawal from 
the welfare state. 16 An example of this in practice is the behaviour of the Auckland 
City Mission when the housing reforms of 1991 were introduced. The housing 
reforms replaced subsidised rental accommodation with market rents. The Auckland 
City Mission runs a food bank in Auckland. They found that demand for food parcels 
more than doubled when the reforms were introduced and that the recipients of its 
13 Treasury Working Party on Charities 2"d Report. June 12 2002 . 
http://www.treasury.govt.nzJcharities/2ndreport/2ndrep-wprrmc.pdf (Last Accessed 14 August 2002) 
14 http: //www.taxpo1icy.ird .govt.nzJindex.php?view= l92 Dr Cullen. (Last Accessed 14 August 2002) 
15 Philanthropy New Zealand "Submission to the Working Party on Tax and Charities 200 l ", 5. 
16 This process was first started by the 1990 National Government who cut benefits from the 1
51 of April 
1991 . http://www.geocities.com/nzwomen/SusanStJohn/200 l 12PolicyPaper231 .doc Susan St John: 
Discussion Paper, page 4, Financial Assistance for the Young NZ's Incoherent Welfare State. (Last 
Accessed August 14
111 2002). 
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food parcels were paying between 45-60 percent of their income in rent.
17 Without 
this behaviour some of this burden would have shifted to the state through 
emergency benefits, increased health costs and other social costs associated with 
poverty. As the governments withdrew from providing social welfare the charitable 
sector became an important safety net to low income New Zealanders. The 
government's support of charities could be seen as a way of mitigating the effects of 
policy decisions on the community. 
Charities can also be a cheap and effective form of service provision. As 
charities generally run off voluntary support they can often provide more services for 
less money. The indirect subsidy offered through the tax system may cost the 
government less than actually providing all the services themselves. Roughly 
speaking $1.00 of tax revenue forgone will provide $3 .00 in services. 
18 There has 
been criticism that the government has not looked closely at the value of volunteer 
time 19• This is despite the fact that over 400,000 New Zealanders identified 
themselves as being volunteers in the latest census2°. Charities have the further 
benefit of being involved in the community they wish to help; this means they are in 
a position to better target services. They can also offer a more flexible approach, they 
can ascertain shifting support requirements and change accordingly without the 
bureaucracy of government. 
Socially there is benefit to the community beyond the services provided. The 
promotion of altruistic behaviour will lead to a growth in the sense of community. 
Charities' independence means they can act as an important watchdog for 
marginalized members of society. It should be mentioned that this is somewhat 
17 Diane Robertson and Margaret Flaws Charity and Change (200 I) NZLS 61 , 61. 
18 Philanthropy New Zealand "Submission to the Working Party on Tax and Charities 200 l "4. 
http ://www.treasury.govt.nzJtaxreview200 I /Subs I /PhilanthropyNewZealand.pdf (Last accessed 24 August 
2002) 
19 Philanthropy New Zealand "Submission to the Working Party on Tax and Charities 200 I", 2. 
20 200 I Census " Unpaid Activities" Table 31 . 
http://www.stats.govt.nzJdomino/external/web/CensusTables.nsf/5980206b72060e97cc256b56006853ca/c9 
291403f6620474cc256b6d0074a5a9/$FILE/Table%2031 .xls (Last Accessed August 25 , 2002) 
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limited by the exclusion of "political" activities form the definition of charity
21
. It 
seems unusual that charities have more limited freedom of speech than individuals or 
companies, especially considering this aspect of their role. The charitable sector can 
have an important role in promoting pluralism, freedom of expression and freedom 
of association that are necessary in promoting the rule of law and democracy. 22 Even 
with its current limits this role is still an important element in a modern democracy. 
While charities are seen as making a large contribution to society they have 
difficulty when trying to raise capital funds. 23 Due to restrictions on distributions 
charities find it hard to raise capital through shareholders. This is especially relevant 
when there is a trading company with a charitable purpose. For example Sanitarium 
is a charitable breakfast food company, but still has to compete with non-charitable 
companies like Kellogs. The ability of Kellogs to raise share capital through 
shareholders will leave Sanitarium at a real disadvantage.24 While this disadvantage 
is more pronounced in a competitive environment it also applies to any charity 
wishing to expand. Debt financing is also difficult Due to the unstable nature of 
donations as a source of income debt financing becomes difficult due to an inability 
to guarantee repayment. The tax exemption can be seen as a very rough way to make 
up for these disadvantages. 
BJ How does the Government Support Charities? 
The government supports charities through the tax system in two broad ways. 
First charities get an exemption from income tax under s CB( 4 )( 1 )( c) and ( e) of the 
Income Tax Act.25 Secondly donors get a rebate on donations below $650.
26 This 
supports charities in two ways; firstly their income increases by a third through the 
21 Perri 6 and Anita Randon Liberty, Charity and Politics: Non-Profit Law and Freedom of Speech 
(Dartmouth Publishing Company, Hants, England, 1995), 99. 
22 Karla. W Simon The Role of law in Encouraging Civil Society (1999) ICNL, 
http://www.icnl.org/gendocs/Arabconf.htm (Last accessed August 27 2002) 
23 Gino Dai Pont Charity Law in New Zealand and Australia (Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 
Victoria, Australia, 2000) 447. 
24 "Weetbicking on Tax" Sun Herald, Sydney, Australia, Feb 18 200 I, 22. 
25 Income Tax Act 1994, CB(4)(I)c. 
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forgoing of tax revenue by the government, and secondly donations to charities are 
encouraged through the ability to get a rebate on those donations. 
As a rebate for donations needs to be claimed back from IRD the government 
has some idea of the amount this system is costing them. However the exemption 
from income tax for charities is a broad exemption. This means the government has 
no idea how much this subsidy is costing. The courts have the responsibility of 
deciding charitable status. As most charities do not go to court over their charitable 
status technically a charity could exist and gain the exemption without the 
government being aware of this. The broad exemption creates the primary problem 
in this system, a total lack of information. There is no information about how much 
this costs, where the money is going or how it is being used. Rebates on donations 
cannot be used as a reliable guide as there is no information on what proportion of 
donors claim this rebate. The government at present has very little information with 
which to analyse the charitable sector in New Zealand.27 
II) ACCOUNTABILITY. 
While charities act with public money they are also independent from public 
bodies. They are largely funded off public money, whether through direct public 
donations or through the subsidy received from the tax system. Their reliance on 
public money should require them to be publicly accountable for their actions. 
Accountability in the charitable sector will largely revolve around the systems to 
provide information. These would allow the public and the government to ascertain 
whether charities are acting with integrity and appropriately using the money they 
receive. On a basic level this information would ensure they are fulfilling their 
charitable purpose. At a higher level this may ensure that charities are using money 
in the best way to produce as much public benefit for the community as possible. 
26 lncome Tax Act 1994, KC5, DJ4 . 
27 Inland Revenue Department Tax and Charities: Discussion Document. (Wellington 200 I) Foreword. 
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Charities by their nature do not fit comfortably into existing accountability 
frameworks. They are not contracted to provide specific services. As there is no 
requirement to provide specific services, there is no requirement to record progress 
or to report back on the way the money was ultimately used. The only requirement is 
that charities fit into a very broad charitable purpose. The current system is even 
limited at ensuring that the charitable purpose is being fulfilled . Charities receive 
income from two main sources, the state and donors. Each has specific accountability 
issues. 
A) Accountability to the State. 
The state is foregoing revenue in two ways, firstly through the income tax 
exemption and secondly through offering rebates to donors . This revenue needs to be 
made up in other parts of the system, meaning the decision to not collect tax can be 
seen as analogous to a government spending decision. As stated by Lord Bremwell in 
Pemsels case "to exempt any subject to a taxation from a tax is to add to the burden 
on tax payers generally."28 As a form of government spending the government has no 
direct control other how or where this is being spent or even the total amount of 
expenditure. This leads to problems. There is concern that this lack of information 
may allow charities to deviate form their charitable purpose without any real scrutiny 
to put them back on track. Further the lack of transparency means that government 
has no idea how much it is spending in each area or what services are being 
provided. This may lead to overlap between state and charitable service provision, or 
lead to disproportional weighting of government spending in certain areas. The 
subsidies may even be damaging to the economy through promoting growth in 
sectors in inefficient ways.29 There has been the suggestion that charities with a 
trading arm may be using the subsidy to retain higher earnings and gain a 
competitive advantage over other organisations in the market.30 This may cause 
28 Commissioners f or Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC at 566 per Lord Bremwell. 
29 Inland Revenue Department Tax and Charities: Discussion Document. (Wellington 200 I) 2 .12 
30 Inland Revenue Department Tax and Charities: Discussion Document. (Wellington 200 I) 9.1. 
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charities with sufficient capital to invest money in trading operations rather than 
other areas that would appear more lucrative without the subsidy. 
From a policy point of view there are also problems, the current system gives 
charity support by income rather than need. A large charity will receive more 
government funding than a smaller one who works in an area of greater need. There 
are further concerns that the current system provides a gap in the tax base that may 
be utilised by individuals rather than the charity themselves. A current illustration of 
this is the use of charities in mass marketed tax schemes. 31 
BJ Accountability to Donors. 
In the later part of the 201h century there have been an increasing number of 
charities that collect from the public instead of relying on private donations. With 
this shift in behaviour there has also been a growth in the number of professional 
fundraisers and an increase in the cost of fundraising in general. This trend has lead 
to new accountability issues. How much money is going to professional companies 
and not the charities?32 Are fundraising techniques appropriate?33 A current example 
of this is the tele-marketing style fundraising. An employee will call people and ask 
for donations for a charity. This illustrates both of these issues. Firstly how much of 
the donation is going to the tele-marketers? These are professional operations, they 
may be able to return higher overall returns to a charity, but a greater proportion of 
the donation may be going to the business. Secondly is this creating a public 
nuisance and invading donor's privacy? The more widespread this becomes the more 
of a nuisance it becomes. From an accountability perspective the issue here is 
whether fundraising practices are creating a public nuisance or infringing on donor 
privacy. New Zealand has no regulation in this area at the moment. 34 
31IRD Policy Division Mass Marketed Tax Schemes (Wellington, January 2002), 5. 32 Gino Dai Pont Charity law in New Zealand and Australia (Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 
Victoria, Australia, 2000) , 444. 
33 Seep. Luxton , Charity Fund-Raising and the Public interest, Averbury, Aldershot, 1990, Ch.5. 34 Gino Dai Pont Charity law in New Zealand and Australia (Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 
Victoria, Australia, 2000), 444. 
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Regulation of this area is not difficult and is common in overseas 
jurisdictions. In Australia this is done at State level. The Australian Central 
Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, South Australia and Western 
Australia all have provisions specifically dealing with charitable fundraising. The 
following passage will give a brief over view of the ACT and NSW provisions. The 
Central Territory has the Collections Act 199235 to regulate fundraising. This makes 
it an offence for an unlicensed or unauthorised person to collect from members the 
public or for a licensed person to collect outside the provisions of their license36. A 
license can be obtained by writing to the Minister stating the purposes to which the 
goods or money collected will be put, for what period the license is required and 
contain particulars of expenses proposed to be incurred in connection with the 
collections37. The Minister may refuse the license in some circumstances, primarily 
this is around there being either limited or no public interest. This includes if 
expenses incurred in collecting the donations will be too high. The Minister can also 
deny licenses on the ground that there are too many other licenses already issued for 
the same period.38 After collections have been made under the license the licensee 
must submit to the minister a written statement verified by statutory declaration 
setting out the money or the goods collected, details of the expenses incurred and the 
manner in which the proceeds have been dealt with.39 NSW has similar provisions in 
their Charitable Fundraising Act 1991.40 The NSW legislation goes further. Face to 
face collectors are required to display prominently an identification badge and 
employed tele-marketers must disclose the fact that they are employed and who has 
employed them.41 The legislation also addresses the potential for direct marketing 
techniques such as tele-marketing to become a nuisance. The authorised fundraisers 
must have a code of practice that must include provisions that will prescribe that a 
35 Collections Act 1992 (ACT) 
36 Gino Dai Pont Charity Law in New Zealand and Australia (Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 
Victoria, Australia, 2000), 388. 
37 Collections Act 1959 (ACT) s. 3( I) 
38 Collections Act 1959 (ACT) s I 0-11. 
39 
Collections Act 1959 (ACT) s. 8(1 ), s.8(2). 
4° Charitable Fundraising Act 1991 (NSW). 
4 1 Charitable Fundraising Regulation 1998 (NSW r. I 0) 
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person must be removed from any database if they ask and that personal information 
will not be sold without the individual's permission.42 Legislation like this would 
cover most potential issues outlined above. The license system would keep check on 
the amount of money going to professional fundraisers and the requirement that there 
is disclosure of the fact that the person that requests a donation is actually employed 
gives the donator some idea that some of the money will be going to a business. The 
license system will also avoid direct marketing nuisances. Only a limited amount of 
fundraisers will have a license at any time and individuals can be removed from the 
tele-marketing database and avoid being called by the same company again. 
Legislation like this could be very effective and quite simple to implement. If a 
Charities Commission was implemented the license system could fit well into its 
other tasks. 
Fundraising is only the beginning of possible public interest in accountability 
of charities. The public provide donations to charities to perform services for third 
parties. This makes it extremely hard for them to evaluate these services, yet as a 
source of funding for charities donors should have the information available to 
ensure the money is spent appropriately. This currently does not happen. Charities 
wishing to become more accountable also face issues. Donors vary from those giving 
continuing support, to large one off donations to those giving money to collectors on 
the street. Many donations are effectively anonymous; some donors may not even 
know the specific charity they are dealing with. This can make it extremely hard to 
find out who charities are accountable to. Charities themselves have viewed the 
current level of accountability as a problem that may be damaging to the sector.43 
The government has also highlighted this problem. The Minister of Finance the 
Right Honourable Dr Cullen commented in a recent address. 
42 Charitable Fundraising Regulation 1998 (NSW) Sch. I cl. 13(2) 
43 Philanthropy New Zealand No. 2 Draft, Accountability of Charities & Sporting Bodies Working Party 
Comprehensive Report (Wellington Feb 1997). 
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"There is currently no reliable information base and no simple means for members of the 
public to check the bona tides of organisations claiming charitable status."44 
There is a call for more accountability from all sectors, the question is how to 
best implement this in New Zealand's charitable sector. 
III) EXISTING ACCOUNTABILITY. 
Before rev1ewmg the proposed systems of greater accountability it is 
necessary to review the current system. The accountability of charities in New 
Zealand is not a coherent system but there are some mechanisms in place. In some 
circumstances the state will make direct grants to charities. For example Creative 
New Zealand makes grants to New Zealand organisations operating in the Arts. 
Often these organisations are charitable. An example application requires that 
organisations show they are organised and have budgeted their project.45 The board 
will also require feedback to ensure the funding was used correctly. Members of the 
public and the government will also contract directly with some organisations to 
provide services. For example the St Johns Ambulance will charge fees for a First 
Aid course, in these circumstances there is a contract of service that can provide for 
accountability. 46 
In order to get a tax exemption in New Zealand a charity must fit into the 
definition of charity outlined above. All of these heads have the public benefit as an 
inherent part of their definition. This definition itself can be seen as a form of 
accountability , those organisations with the label charity are seen to be acting 
primarily in the public benefit and therefore worthy of support. However, as will be 
shown, there is little to ensure that this definition is strictly adhered to. 
44 Hon Dr Michael Cullen, Minister of Finance "Charities Report Received" (Wellington, 151 March 2002) 
http ://www.executive.govt.nz/speech.cfm?speechralph=37478&SR=Ob (Last Accessed 23 August 2002). 45See http: //www.creativenz.govt.nz/funding/board/dance .html (Last accessed 27 August 2002). 46 See http ://www.stjohn.org.nz/products/first_ aid_ kits.asp (Last accessed 27 August 2002) 
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The courts officially decide whether an organisation has charitable status. 
However most charities do not go to court over their charitable status. There is also 
no legal requirement for registration.47 This means that technically a charity could 
exist and gain a tax exemption without the government being aware of it. 48 In 
practice charities generally have their tax-exempt status unofficially approved by 
IRD.49 This is usually done by having a statement of charitable purpose in their 
memorandum of incorporation or submitting their founding documents to IRD. 50 The 
Department of Inland Revenue does not appear to keep many records of the charities 
it approves. 51 Further section CB4 of the Income Tax Act52 only requires that a 
charity was established with a charitable purpose to receive a tax exemption. What 
this means is that an organisation may set up with a charitable purpose but may now 
be operating outside that purpose while still receiving the exemption. Tax and 
Charities considered the option of leaving the current definition but changing section 
CB4 of the Income Tax Act to require that a charity was not only established for a 
charitable purpose but also continued to fulfil that purpose. 53 This simple change 
would have a large effect on accountability; it makes little sense for an organisation 
that was set up for a charitable purpose can continue to receive benefits while not 
fulfilling its charitable purpose. While there may be practical issues about monitoring 
the on going activities of charities, there is no clear policy reason for looking only at 
the purpose of the charity when it was set up and not how it is currently operating. 
The current approach means that an organisation with charitable status may not be 
offering any public benefit and the justifications for the government support is gone. 
47 Working Party on Charities Report on Reporting and Monitoring of Charities (Wellington, February 
2002), 2. 
48 Gino Dai Pont Charity law in New Zealand and Australia (Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 
Victoria, Australia, 2000) 371 
49 IRD Tax Policy Department Tax and Charities: Discussion Document (Wellington June 200 I) para 6 .3 
50 Gino Dai Pont Charity law in New Zealand and Australia (Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 
Victoria, Australia, 2000) 371 
5 1 David McClay Charities and Tax in 2001 (200 I) NZLJ 63 , 63 . 
52 Income Tax Act I 996, sCB4. 
53 Inland Revenue Department Tax and Charities: Discussion Document. (Wellington 200 I), 21 . 
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At present there are currently only limited auditing systems available. The 
IRD does have a role to ensure that CB4 of the Income Tax Act is complied with. 54 
However due to the lack of registration there is no information available to make a 
decision on who to audit, this would involve extremely pro-active work on behalf of 
IRD to be effective. 55 
The Attorney General has the official role of protecting charities in New 
Zealand. Under s 58 of the Charitable Trusts Act there is the power to "examine and 
inquire all or any charities in New Zealand."56 There is further power to require any 
person with a concern in the management of the charity to produce documents and 
answer questions. Failure to do so is an offence carrying a fine of $40. Although the 
purpose of section 5 8 is to find out what is happening, there is no power to execute a 
search warrant, freeze a bank account, or direct the trustee's in the administration of 
the trust. 57 The Attorney Generals role is not broad and usually receives an average 
of about ten complaints a year. 58 
In practice once a complaint is received most investigations are delegated to 
the Deputy Solicitor-General under s9c of the Constitution Act 1986. The focus of 
the inquiry is to ensure that trust property is in fact being applied for the charitable 
purpose that it was set up for. This does not inquire into whether the property is 
being put to its best use, only that the use is in line with its charitable purpose. 
The Attorney General or anybody else with an interest in the trust can also 
apply to the high court under s 60 of the Charitable Trusts Act for specific court 
orders. 
- order the trustees to carry out the trusts, 
54 Income Tax Act 1994. 
55 Inland Revenue Department Tax and Charities: Discussion Document. (Wellington 2001 ), 31. 
56 Charitable Trusts Act l 957,s58 
57 Margaret Soper, "The Protector of Charities" (2002) NZLJ 57, 57. 
58 Margaret Soper, "The Protector of Charities" (2002) NZLJ 57,59. 
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- order the trustees to meet any liability for any breach of trust, 
- exclude any purpose from the trusts, 
- give directions on the administration of the trust, 
- direct the preparation of a scheme to vary the terms of the trust. 59 
Applications to the court after a section 58 inquiry have been rare but do 
exist. In Re Centrepoint Community Growth Trust60 a public trustee was appointed 
and preparations were made to vary the trust scheme. In Hunter v Hunter61 The court 
set down the principles for appointment of a new trustee under s 51 of the Trustee 
Act. The principle approach to this is to consider the welfare of the beneficiaries. In 
Attorney General v Ngati Karewa and Ngati Tahinga Trust62 this approach was 
applied to a charitable trust. 
The Attorney Generals role also has issues regarding jurisdiction. Section 58 
of the Charitable Trusts Act refers to charities in general while section 60 is based on 
the presumption of a trust.63 As all charities are not trusts this raises the issue about 
whether the Attorney General's powers reach to non-trust charities. If the charitable 
purpose was in a different form, say the rules of an incorporated society, then 
arguably the Attorney General could have no power of inquiry under s5 8 if there was 
no subsequent power to enforce the charitable purpose under s60 of the Act.64 The 
role of the Attorney General is quite a limited one. It has its place in the regulation of 
charities but cannot be seen as an effective mechanism to hold all charities 
accountable. 
The courts have jurisdiction to judicially review decisions made by charities 
when these decisions could have a significant effect on New Zealand ' s social 
59 Margaret Soper, "The Protector of Charities" (2002) NZLJ 57, 58 . 
60 [2000] 2 NZLR 325 
6 1 [1938] NZLR 520. 
62 High Court, Auckland, M 2073/99 and CP 242/00, 5 November 200 I 
63 Charitable Trusts Act 1957 
64 Margaret Soper, "The Protector of Charities" (2002) NZLJ 57, 58 . 
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structure. This follows normal judicial review processes, namely that it is a review 
not an appeal and a court will only intervene if the decision-making process of the 
body is flawed. To date the courts have assumed jurisdiction to review decisions 
made by SOE's, by the committee of a trade union, by a sporting association and by 
an incorporated society.65 This power is seldom used and is unlikely to have a great 
effect on most charities. 
There are other methods of Ad Hoe accountability in existence. The 
consumer's institute has inquired into charities in the past in order to provide their 
members some form of accountability; this is likely to happen again. The media has 
reported cases of charities that seem to operating in a less than scrupulous manner. A 
recent example of this was allegations that the Pub Charity system was being abused. 
Pub Charity is a system where a 33% of takings from poker machines must be given 
to charity. The media highlighted allegations that some people were redirecting 
monies from the pub to the charity and back to the pub through paying elevated 
prices for advertisements. While these systems do provide some form of 
accountability it is selective. The media may choose to ignore some unscrupulous 
behaviour while focusing on others. A story can easily be blown out of proportion in 
order to sell more copy. It will also highlight the failing of a few individuals, which 
will then undermine the entire sector' s credibility. Some charities will escape direct 
scrutiny while deserving charities will be disadvantaged by a distorted overall view 
of the sector. 
Some charities already have some forms of self-regulation. Related charities 
currently organise and join umbrella organisations66. These can have internal 
measures to ensure that charities are living up to the umbrella organisations 
65 Philanthropy New Zealand No. 2 Draft, Accountability of Charities & Sporting Bodies Working Party 
Comprehensive Report (Wellington Feb 1997). 
66 There are many examples of these organizations. Philanthropy New Zealand is a New Zealand umbrella 
organisation for Philanthropic Trusts . Health Care Aotearoa is an umbrella organisation for Not for Profit 
health care organisations. 
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standards. The problem here is that in establishing internal procedures the 
organisations may have an interest in not highlighting problems or setting itself low 
standards that are easily meet. 
IV). SUGGESTED CHANGES TO IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY. 
There are many approaches to making the charitable sector more accountable. 
Any approach will need to consider many factors. Does it provide accountability to 
donors? The government? How expensive will it be? Will it be acceptable to the 
sector, government and the public? This next section will be an overview of some 
suggested approaches, many of these are not exclusive, but can be used together as 
part of a package. 
A) Registration 
A system of registration would operate by requiring charities to register 
before they gained any tax benefits. Along with registration there could be a 
requirement for simple reporting requirements. These reports could be made publicly 
available. This system can also go further by ensuring that organisations act within 
the definition of charity. People giving donations will therefore be more assured that 
organisations at least fit into the broad definition of what is charitable. If this were 
used by itself, the role of this office would simply be a record keeping one. This 
means it could be part of an existing department, probably IRD. While there is the 
potential for a conflict here this should be quite low as this would largely be an 
administrative role. Administration costs will be low as no new structures are 
required, however the exact system of registration will dictate the overall level of 
administration and compliance costs. The Attorney General role may be expanded as 
registration could highlight more behaviour that will lead to complaints. There are 
two broad approaches to registration: 
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I). Informal registration 
This involves a "signing up" approach to registration. The charity states its 
charitable purpose which is accepted until it is disproved.67 There is no formal 
approval process but the charity may be required to demonstrate its charitable 
purpose at some time. Once a charity is registered it can then claim the tax 
exemption. This system could be a useful way to gain more information on the 
sector. This could let the government know the amount of charities operating and the 
amount the subsidy is costing, however as a method of accountability it is still 
incomplete. There is little incentive for charities to ensure they are actually following 
their charitable purpose. There is still no scrutiny of how the money is being spent. 
The label "charity" may still be abused. 
2). Formal Regulation 
This approach would require an investigation by the relevant body. An 
organisation would apply to be registered as a charity and would only be registered 
after an investigation showed that it was in fact carrying out a charitable purpose. 
After this a charity would expect to have regular monitoring of its operations to 
ensure that it was still meeting its charitable purpose. This system would have the 
same information gathering advantages as above. The view of the Working Party 
Charities was that this system would have advantages above informal registration. It 
would ensure only real charities got the tax exemption and then ensure they kept 
strictly to their charitable purpose.68 From a general public point of view this would 
ensure that when they gave a donation to a registered charity they would be an 
organisation worthy of the title charity. There has been concern from the sector that 
67 Inland Revenue Department Tax and Charities: Discussion Document. (Wellington 200 I), I 9. 
68 Working Party on Charities Report on Reporting and Monitoring of Charities (Wellington, February 
2002), 15. 
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this approach could lead to a level of bureaucracy in the sector that may be avoided 
by the simple "signing up" process outlined above. 69 
BJ Reporting 
Either of these systems could also have a reporting requirement. The proposal 
is that after registration the charities would be asked to prepare formal accounts that 
are available to both the government and the public. The proposal also suggests that 
a suitable threshold could be put in place to ensure small charities do not suffer 
undue hardship. This approach is used in other jurisdictions. In the UK the 
Commissioner of Charities requires reporting from charities earning over 10,000 
pounds. When a charity earns over 100,000 pounds they must get their accounts 
audited. 70 Smaller charities are removed from the scheme while larger charities have 
more stringent requirements as they can afford it. 
There could also be a requirement to file audited tax returns. Under s 58 the 
Attorney General already has the power to require this but it is rarely exercised. 71 
The advantage of this over and above the general accounts already mentioned is that 
the government would have more accurate information about the amount of tax 
foregone. 
While the government has indicated that its preference is for a system of 
formal registration along with other regulation it has not been included in its latest 
Bill. 72 The government is "still considering any change".73 It has been suggested that 
this system alone is all that will be required in the sector and further regulation will 
69 Philanthropy New Zealand "Submission to the Working Party on Tax and Charities 200 I", 7. 
70 Inland Revenue Department Tax and Charities: Discussion Document. (Wellington 200 I) page 63. 
71 Section 58 Charitable Trusts Act. 
72 Taxation (Annual Returns, Maori Organisations, Taxpayer Compliance and Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Bill 2002. 
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not be worth the expense it will carry .74 Publicly available accounts would let 
everybody have the information available to decide if a charity is a worthy cause. 
The media and the consumers institute could better perform their watchdog role by 
having access to information. The government will know how much it is spending on 
the charity subsidy and also know the general areas it is spending in. This system 
could be effective in providing information at a relatively low cost. There have 
however been problems highlighted with this approach. First it assumes charities are 
run off public donations, whereas some charities run off the benefit of a few private 
donors. Having published accounts may put off some of these donors for privacy 
reasons.75 Implementation of a system like this should consider whether there would 
be a detrimental effect on donating behaviour. 
Such a system would also have accountability shortcomings. The information 
provided by the accounts has been suggested as income and expenditure, assets and 
liabilities and perhaps remuneration to senior staff.76 This may not provide a 
complete picture. While this approach will show income sources and give a good 
indication on whether a charity is fulfilling its charitable purpose it will not show 
whether a charity is running effectively or efficiently. A charity may be running to its 
purpose but not producing a large amount of services to the community. If the public 
benefit is present but is low then the accounts will not highlight this. A lot of 
charities work will be hard to quantify, meaning that whatever form the accounts 
take it will not show the complete picture. This approach would also not show 
whether charities are crossing over services with either the state or other charities 
and will not co-ordinate and connect the charitable sector. A simple registration 
system will add costs to charities without returning anything in the way of support or 
advice. This could build resentment in the sector, making any changes hard to 
implement smoothly. 
73 Commentary on Bill Taxation (Annual Returns, Maori Organisations, Taxpayer Compliance and 
Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2002, 46. 
74 David McClay Regulation of Charities (2002) NZLJ 55,55 . 
75 Philanthropy New Zealand "Submission to the Working Party on Tax and Charities 200 I", 7. 
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C) A Charities Commission 
A charities commission would be an independent body that would operate for 
all charities needs, not just a registrar of charities. This would include advice on both 
legal and practical issues. A charities commission can also work to connect and 
network charities and generally make the sector run more efficiently. The Spencer 
Russell Report on Charities in New Zealand first recommended a Charities 
Commission in 1989.77 This document was the first formal look into the charitable 
sector in New Zealand. No action was taken at the time and recommendation was 
repeated 13 years later by the Working Party on Charities. 78 
I) . The English model 
In the UK most charities were historically endowed trusts. Charities 
legislation was framed on that basis. In the later half of the 20th century there was 
shift from endowed trusts to the fundraising trusts that are more common in New 
Zealand. 79 This changing environment lead to the 1987 Woodfeild Report, which 
was followed by a White Paper80 . The purpose of this paper was to suggest possible 
ways of implementing the Woodfeild Report. This process acknowledged a shift in 
the make up of the charitable sector in England that has made it very similar to the 
New Zealand charitable sector. This change and the legislative response makes the 
UK Charities Commission a likely model for a New Zealand Charities Commission. 
The Charities Commission is an independent body that decides charitable status and 
76 Working Party on Charities Report on Reporting and Monitoring of Charities (Wellington, February 
2002), 22. 
77 Working Party on Charities and Sporting Bodies Report to the Minister of Finance and the Minister of 
Social Welfare. (Wellington, November, 1989), 62. 
78 Working Party on Charities Report on Reporting and Monitoring of Charities (Wellington, February 
2002) 
79 Working Party on Charities and Sporting Bodies Report to the Minister of Finance and the Minister of 
Social Welfare. (Wellington, November, 1989), 59 . 
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keeps a register of charities that have receipts of over 10, OOO pounds. Its role goes 
further than just registration; its stated aim is to "give public confidence in the 
integrity of charity."81 
The Charities Commission in the UK has four mam roles. Firstly the 
Commission registers organisations that it decides have a charitable purpose. The 
Commission's role has been criticised as largely supplanting the courts role in 
deciding who is or is not a charity. 82 The concern is that a Charities Commission may 
use a bureaucratic formula based approach of what is charitable that does not move 
with changing times and attitudes. In reality the commission's role could more 
accurately be seen as building on the existing common law. When considering 
whether an organisation is charitable the first step would be to apply the current 
common law definition, and to then have a procedure in place to expand the 
definition if it is required. 83 
This is a two-step process. First is the purpose analogous to a purpose 
originally accepted as charitable and, secondly, does the purpose satisfy the public 
benefit test. In practice the UK Charities Commission has not let the law stagnate 
and has decided that the General Medical Council was a charity despite the decisions 
in General Medical Council v IRC 84 and General Medical Council v St Marylebone 
Borough Counciz85. Due to the charities commissions role they are in a position to 
keep the law more up to date than the courts. While the courts will only see a small 
proportion of charities the commission will investigate most of them. The courts are 
not totally removed from the UK system, there can be an appeal through the court 
system if the decision of the Commissioner is incorrect at law. 
80 Home Department Charities: A Framework for the Future (London, May, 1989). 
81 See http: //www.charity-commission.gov.uk/tcc/aimvv.asp. (Last accessed 22 August 2002). 
82 David McClay " Regulation of Charities" NZLJ 2002 55 , 56 . 
83 UK Charities Commission RR I a Recognising a New Charitable Purpose 
84 
[ 1928] All ER 252 (CA) 
85 [1958] AC 540 (HL) 
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The second function of the commissioner is to draft regulations prescribing 
the content of accounting standards, statement of account and annual returns and 
reports, which registered charities must prepare. In New Zealand this approach 
would involve working closely with the Chartered Accountants Association and 
charities in order to formulate workable standards for charities that provide useful 
and timely information for interested members of the public. The third function of 
the commission is to provide support and guidance to charities through a general 
newsletter, giving individual advice after requests or when following up monitoring. 
Fourthly the commission has the power to investigate complaints from the public or 
after its own monitoring. 86 In this respect a charities commission in New Zealand 
could be seen to assume the current role of the Attorney General. 
The concept of the commission is that due to its work the public can be 
assured that a charity is being run efficiently and to its charitable purpose. The 
commission itself is a form of accountability, as donors will know that because the 
commission is involved a charity will be running properly. The commissions role sits 
somewhere between that of a public enforcement agency, such as the Commerce 
Commission, and a professional regulatory body such as the Medical Council or the 
Law Society. 87 The later bodies have in the past been criticised as protecting their 
members rather than acting to protect the public. The UK commission largely avoids 
this by keeping an open register of charities; this means that the public can 
investigate charities themselves. This ensures the Commission's role is transparent 
enough to avoid any suggestion that its role may in fact be to protect charities rather 
than make them accountable. The Charities Commission will also act on complaints 
from the public; this can remove costs through time and money and therefore 
increase the willingness of public to make complaints. This role may not be overly 
86 Gino Dai Pont Charity law in New Zealand and Australia (Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 
Victoria, Australia, 2000), 440. 
87 Kate Tokeley Consumer law (Butterworths, Wellington, 2000), 381. 
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different to the current role of the Attorney General, but its high profile may mean 
that it is accessed more often. 
2) Why a Charities Commission is preferred in New Zealand. 
The Working Party on Charities saw a Charities Commission as most suitable 
for New Zealand88. An independent body was seen as necessary to reflect the 
independence and importance of the sector in New Zealand. As such this was seen as 
the most acceptable body to the charitable sector. Acceptance form the sector was 
considered to be very important in the practical implementation of any system. This 
approach was also seen as being consistent with the 1989 Spencer Russell report. 
The approach was seen as being in-line with the governments newly 
produced 'Statement of Government Intentions for Improved Government-
Community Relations' .89 This document is used to provide background policy for 
working with voluntary or Maori/iwi organisations. This statement of principle was 
written after the report Communities and Government: Potential for Partnership90. 
This found that a decade of social and economic change had left many in the Not-
for-Prof88it sector feeling under-valued and mistrusting government. The Statement 
of Government Intentions for Improved Government-Community Relations 
specifically acknowledged the importance of the independence of the third sector. 
Any regulation should be in line with this statement in order to show the 
government's commitment to this document. Consistently with the document is also 
more likely to get support from the sector that could help avoid unnecessary 
transitional problems. 
88 Working Party on Charities Report on Reporting and Monitoring of Charities (Wellington, February 
2002), 21. 
89 Ministry of 8Social Policy Statement of Government Intentions for Improved Goverriment-Community 
Relations. (Wellington, 200 I). 
90 Department of Social Welfare Communities and Government: A Potential/or Partnership. Wellington 
(August 2000). 
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3) Criticisms of this approach. 
The first of these is that this approach will be expensive. The cost of setting 
up the new body will be large; in England the Charities Commission employs over 
540 staff. In New Zealand we will have far less charities. While this means the 
charities commission will be smaller it also means we will be unable to achieve the 
same savings through economies of scale. There is also concern over who will fund 
this. If fees from charities fund it, then there could be a perception that a substantial 
part of any donation will go to the Charity Commission bureaucracy. In the same 
way that donors need to be aware how much money is spent on professional 
fundraisers , they also need to know how much is going to the bureaucracy or how 
much is being funded through the taxpayer. Estimations of the costs to charities if the 
recommendations in Tax and Charities91 were implemented are up to between 
$10,000-$15 ,000 dollars initially and then another $5,000 each return after that 92 . 
There is also criticism of the type of bodies like the Charities Commission. In 
Inside Bureaucrac/ 3 Anthony Downs explored the behaviour of Bureaucrats. Some 
of these were found to be "Empire Building", these people acted to expand the role 
of their body unnecessarily. Keeping the registration system inside an existing body 
would lesson the chance of this happening and simplify regulation 94. 
The government has stressed that this is what the sector wanted; this does not 
appear to be consistent with the views of Philanthropy New Zealand. Philanthropy 
New Zealand was set up after the Russell Report was released in 1989. It has 111 
members who are grant-making trusts in New Zealand. Their purpose is to educate 
9 1 Inland Revenue Department Tax and Charities: Discussion Document. (Wellington 2001 ) 
92 "Charities may bear costly burden of a tax shake up ; Tax and charities : Main proposals" The Dominion, 
Wellington , New Zealand June 20 2001 , 29 . 
93 Anthony Downs Inside Bureaucracy (Scott Foresman, 1967) 
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the public, conduct research and to lobby for change. In 1999 they produced a report 
that considered proposals for accountability of the sector. After surveying its 
members its recommendation was for a system of self-regulation. It was accepted 
that this may require some form of legislative under-pinning, but primarily it was 
based the sector developing its own code of practice. This suggests that a Charities 
Commission may not be what the sector wanted. If a Charities Commission does not 
have the support of the charitable sector then this raises several issues. First there is 
likely to be resistance from the sector that will make the implementation of a new 
system very difficult. Secondly this would undermine the Statement of Government 
Intentions for Improved Community-Government Relationships and further create 
mistrust of the government from the charitable sector. The resistance to a Charities 
Commission should not be overstated. Elements of the sector do support the idea of a 
charities commission. The Churches Agency on Social Issues, which is a group 
representing Methodist, Presbyterian, Quaker and the Church of Christ submission 
on Tax and Charities agreed with a simple registration system and thought a 
Charities Commission should be investigated95. Philanthropy New Zealand ' s own 
submission to Tax and Charities seems to show a shift in attitude. The submission 
appears to be based on the presumption of a charities commission, its focus is on the 
shape and role of the commission rather than whether to have one or not. 96 
There is the risk the law will stagnate in the hands of a Charities 
Commission. As mentioned the UK's inbuilt protections have not let this happen. 
There is no reason why the experience in New Zealand should be any different. 
94 David McClay " Regulation of Charities" NZLJ 2002 55 , 56. 
95 Churches Agency on Social Issues . "Submission to Government Discussion Document Tax and 
Charities." http ://www.socialissues.godzone.net.nz/submissions/smtaxcharities.html (Last accessed 21 
August 2002) . 
Philanthropy New Zealand "Submission to the Working Party on Tax and Charities 2001 , 7. 
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D) Semi-Autonomous Body 
This proposal is that a semi-autonomous body would be set up inside an 
existing government department with a statutory advisory board from the charitable 
sector. The statutory committee's role would be to advise government of legislation 
and policy for the sector. The Working party felt either the Department of Internal 
Affairs or the Ministry of Economic Development would be an appropriate 
department in which to establish the body. The Department of Internal Affairs was 
seen as a better option due to its long history of working with community and 
volunteer groups, where the Ministry of Economic Development on the other hand is 
focused only on "economic development" and has little in social or cultural support. 
This was ultimately rejected by the working party as failing to recognise the 
importance and independence of the sector. As such there is unlikely to be a feeling 
of sector ownership and would lack the required support from the sector. The 
Working Party felt that if such a body were to be set up it would not have the 
necessary support of the sector to work effectively. 
E) Business Unit in a Government Department. 
This approach was to have an existing government unit carry out the 
registration and monitoring of charities. This was rejected by the Working Party on 
Charities for three reasons. Firstly it has the same problems as above. Secondly the 
charitable sector would have less opportunity to provide feedback than with a semi 
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autonomous body. Thirdly the business unit could not have the advantage of 
reporting back independently to the government97. 
These two approaches do not appear to be favoured by anybody. If these 
bodies were to have powers similar to the Charities Commission in England this 
would be overly detrimental to the independence of the sector. This could lead to 
organisations simply not claiming charitable status and missing out on deserved 
government support. If its role was only to keep a registrar then this does not provide 
a high level of accountability. These approaches are really a half way house between 
cost and effective accountability, this leaves them with the worst of both worlds. 
They would provide little more accountability than the status quo while costing 
more. 
F) Direct Government Funding. 
Most of the problems with the current system are caused through the lack of 
transparency caused by indirect funding. One possible answer to avoid this is to 
move to model of direct government funding. Charities would pay tax and apply to 
the government for funding. This would let the government know specifically how 
much they spend, what is provided and have all the relevant feedback mechanisms98. 
This would also keep complete tax neutrality in the sector and resolve other issues, 
such as charities being used in the mass marketed tax avoidance schemes. 
While this approach does have some advantages it also has its limits. This 
would mean that the deductibility provisions would need to be repealed which would 
then provide less of an incentive to giving. There would also be higher 
97 Working Party on Charities Report on Reporting and Monitoring of Charities (Wellington, February 
2002), 12. 
98 Gino Dai Pont Charity Law in New Zealand and Australia (Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 
Victoria, Australia, 2000), 451 
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administration costs for both government and charities. This system would require 
charities to apply for funding , and the government to process the claims. These 
factors lead the Spencer Russell Report to reject this approach .99 Further 
consideration must also be given to the effect this would have on the independence 
of the sector. A model like this may stop frank feedback from the sector and 
undermine their role as advocates for marginalized members of society. At present 
charities have been known to criticise the government. Merepeka Raukawa-Tait 
often criticised government policy and legislation while running the ational 
Women's Refuge, and a direct funding model may lead to self-censorship of this 
criticism. This would damage New Zealand ' s society and be inconsistent with the 
Statement of Government Intentions for Improved Government-Community 
Relations 100. 
G) Self-Regulation. 
Philanthropy ew Zealand has argued for a system of self-regulation to be 
introduced in New Zealand. The proposal is that a sector body would be set up which 
would issue a code of practice to which member charities would be required to 
adhere 101 . This body could be implemented in a number of different ways; ultimately 
the approach favoured by Philanthropy ew Zealand was to establish a new stand-
alone committee that would monitor compliance with the code for the whole sector. 
Its role would be more than just monitoring and compliance and would also include 
education about the sector, promotion of the sector and providing support and advice 
to charities 102. 
99 Gino Dai Pont Charity law in New Zealand and Australia (Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 
Victoria, Australia, 2000), 451 . 
100 Minisrty of Social Policy Statement of Government intentions for improved Government-Community 
Relations. (Wellington, 200 l) 
101 Gino Dai Pont Charity Law in New Zealand and Australia (Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 
Victoria, Australia, 2000), 439. 
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One of the main problems with a self-regulated body is how it is funded. A 
self regulating body will need to get all its funding from its members. This may 
prove difficult at the initial stages as start up costs are high and charities may take 
some time to join. This will lead to a situation where foundation members may have 
to pay a substantial amount to join. This will be a further disincentive to join. By 
comparison a charities commission may receive some funding from the government, 
even if this is only for start up costs. It would also have the advantage that all 
charities would be required to join meaning that costs can be spread over the entire 
sector. Philanthropy New Zealand recognised these costs as a problem, and its 
approach was to use existing structures and resources. Its approach was to form a 
consortium of existing sector umbrella bodies. Each co-ordinating body would host 
meetings on a rotational basis. This approach avoided the use of many new structures 
and therefore would keep costs low. 103 
A structure that used umbrella organisations would be more attractive to their 
members, making it more acceptable to the sector. This should lessen transitional 
problems, as the umbrella organisations should already be dealing with self-
regulation issues in their current work. This approach will allow a meeting of the 
umbrella organisations to share expertise and achieve more collaborative solutions. 
The board could also include a member of the consumers institute to avoid the 
concern that these organisations will simply seek to protect their members. 
The code itself would be formulated by the sector. The proposal is that a code 
of practice should be flexible enough to move with the times. There would be the 
adoption of some "guiding principles" which would influence the specific standards 
for the sector. An example of this system is the Maryland Association of Non-Profit 
toz David Robinson Accountability and Self regulation of Charities and Volunta,y Organisations: Project 
Report. (I 999, Wellington, Philanthropy New Zealand). 4. 
103 David Robinson Accountability and Self regulation of Charities and Voluntary Organisations: Project 
Report. ( 1999, Wellington, Philanthropy New Zealand). 4. 
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Organisations.
104 
This is an American organisation that represents over 800 Non-
Profit Organisations. This has eight guiding principles that are used as the base for 
55 standards for members to adhere to. 105 The concept is that while the principles 
will not change the standards will adapt as time passes. 
This system would run on voluntary compliance, there would be no 
legislative enforcement mechanisms. The monitoring body would work by giving 
agencies that implemented the code some form of "badge" that would show that it 
was abiding by the code. This would be a similar type of programme to the heart 
foundations "Pick the Tick" programme which labels foods that are seen to be 
healthy and nutritious.
106 
The approach with charities would be that member 
organisations would all have something to identify themselves as a member, those 
without that "badge" would be assumed not to be living up to the code. Those 
member organisations that do not live up to the code would have this badge 
removed. 
Philanthropy New Zealand has already suggested that such a system may 
require some type of legislative under-pinning, meaning that there is some way to 
force members to follow the code. 107 This approach is to adopt the same codes of 
practice but to give them legislative backing. The codes of practice could be used to 
give donors a remedy if a charity fails to live up to the code of practice. This option 
was discounted by Philanthropy New Zealand because it would require such a large 
amount of lobbying of government. The feeling was that this was a major legislative 
exercise that will just not be practical. 
104 
See http: //www.mdnonprofit.org/ for more information . (Last accessed 22 August 2002) 
105 See http: //www.standardsforexcellence.org/ for more information. (Last accessed 22 August 2002) 
106see http: //www.nhf.org.nz/pick_the_tick/pick_the_tick.html for more information. (Last accessed 22 
August 2002) 
107 
Philanthropy New Zealand No. 2 Draft, Accountability of Charities & Sporting Bodies Working Party 
Comprehensive Report (Wellington Feb 1997) 
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Philanthropy New Zealand is a group representing Charitable Trusts in New 
Zealand. Its suggestion of self-regulation is essentially a self-interested one. The 
media at present provides a random and damaging form of accountability. Self-
regulation is seen as a way in which the sector can therefore become accountable to 
the public and show the sector is generally honest and creditable. With this in mind 
any code adopted would have to be stringent enough to be credible to the public. 
There is suggestion that a person from the consumers institute would be included in 
the process to ensure that any action is transparent and creditable. However there 
may be problems with the suggestion. First the code requires a voluntary signing up 
process. Some charities will be put off with the extra costs through both time and 
money that will be required by this. This means the code is unlikely to cover all 
charities. If there are not a substantial number of members then the idea of a 
"badging" system will not work. Such a system relies on recognition that all charities 
should carry the "badge", less than complete coverage can undermine the entire 
system. A system like this will rely on the "badge" being recognisable, however 
charities may find it hard to justify using their resources to sign up to a system before 
the "badge" is recognisable. 
There are further problems with the proposed system. Philanthropy New 
Zealand's self-regulation proposal was modelled on the experience of the advertising 
industry in New Zealand. The Advertising Industry in NZ has its own code of 
practice and complaints board that hears complaints; members agree that decisions 
are binding on them. Its purpose is to complement the existing law, rather than 
replace it. 108 There are some important differences between the sectors. There are far 
less advertisers in New Zealand than charities. By signing up some big agencies, 
such as TVNZ, you have essentially covered the market. The board can be seen as a 
way of getting a quick solution and avoid expensive court hearings. The system also 
runs on a complaint system, advertising by its nature is in the public eye, causing 
108 See http: //www.asa.co.nzJhowtocomplain.htm for more information. (Last accessed 23 August 2002) 
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member of the public complain . The problem \\·ith haritie i that they are not in 
the public eye; ther i no information to complain on. The role thi body fulfil doe 
not seem to be different to the role of the Attorney General and. a already 
mentioned. this only seems to receiYe a \'ery small amount of complaint each 
year. '09 There is a risk that a self-regulated body will spend more time lobbying 
government than improving accountability to donors or the go\'ernment. 
As mentioned this is a self-interested suggestion that aim at gi\'ing charitie 
a creditable public image. This approach completely ignore accountability to the 
state. A system of reporting may not work in this situation as the member hip i 
w1likely to comprehensive. If reporting \\'ere required many charities would not join 
due to the increase in costs that joining the body will bring. The government in thi 
system will still have no idea of the an1ount they spend. where they pend it and what 
is being provided by the third sector. It is likely that if a system of self-regulation 
was implemented then further regulation will still be required in order for charities to 
be accountable to the government. This s stem is w1suitable from the government" 
point of view. There has also been a shift away from this approach by the sector 
itself. Philanthropy New Zealand who formulated the main arguments for self-
regulation were involved in formulating the terms of reference of the Working Party 
on Charities and had their chair as a Member of the Working Party .11 0 This body 
recommended a Charities Commission to be implemented. 
11 CONCLUSION. 
The charitable sector is in a very delicate situation. Greater accountability is 
required but any system that is implemented needs to work and to be affordable for 
the sector. A system that is implemented and fails will be extremely detrimental to 
109 Margaret Soper, "The Protector of Charities" (2002) NZLJ 57,59 . 
11 0 Judith Timpany was of Chair of Philanthropy ew Zealand and also on the Working Party on Charities. 
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the finances and goodwill of the sector. In this case a Charities Commission would 
be the best option. Primarily it will offer the greatest accountability to both the state 
and the public, however it will also have the advantage that it assists charities. This 
means it is more likely to be accepted by the charitable sector and therefore more 
likely to succeed. New Zealand has the advantage of being able gain the knowledge 
of others who have already implemented such a scheme. New Zealand can move 
forward with a tried and tested scheme that increases the accountability of charities 
while supports them in the same process. 
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